

## XI.—The Occupation of Syria by the Romans

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It has generally been supposed that Pompey's annexation of Syria as a Roman province in 64 B.C. represented the first official step by which Rome gained control of Syria. There exists, however, evidence which indicates that this was not the case, and that the annexation had been preceded by an attempt to turn what was left of the Seleucid realm into a client kingdom. The existence of this effort to set up a client kingdom has been recognized by J. M. Cobban.<sup>1</sup> He did not, however, have occasion to examine all the available evidence, and a new study of the material will produce more detailed knowledge of the way in which the Romans attempted to deal with the problem of the status of Syria at this time.

According to what has been the generally accepted view, the events which led up to the annexation may be summarized as follows.<sup>2</sup> After Tigranes of Armenia occupied Syria in 83 B.C., Selene, widow of Antiochus X Eusebes (95–92 B.C.), sent her two sons to Rome about 72 B.C. These were Antiochus (later Antiochus XIII Asiaticus) and another son whose name we do not know. Antiochus and his brother laid claim to the throne of Syria through their father and to the throne of Egypt through their mother, who had been a princess of the Ptolemaic house. The Senate acknowledged the claim to Syria *de jure*, but took no action with regard to the claim to Egypt.<sup>3</sup> In 69 B.C. Tigranes was forced to evacuate Syria when Lucullus, in his war against Mithridates, Tigranes'

<sup>1</sup> *Senate and Provinces, 78–49 B.C.* (Cambridge, Eng. 1935) 135–136; see also 58.

<sup>2</sup> The most detailed treatment of these events will be found in J. Dobiáš, *Dějiny Římské Provincie Syrské* [*History of the Roman Province of Syria*; in Czech, with summary in French] 1 (Prague 1924) (hereafter cited as Dobiáš, *Dějiny*). The ultimate reasons for the annexation of Syria have been discussed by the same scholar in an article "Les premiers rapports des Romains avec les Parthes et l'occupation de la Syrie," *Archiv orientální*, 3 (1931) 215–256 (hereafter cited as Dobiáš, *Les premiers rapports*). Much new light has recently been thrown on this difficult and obscure period by the study of A. R. Bellinger, "The End of the Seleucids," *Transactions of the Connecticut Academy of Arts and Sciences* 38 (1949) 51–102 (hereafter cited as Bellinger, *End of the Seleucids*).

<sup>3</sup> Cic. *Verr.* 2.4.61; see Dobiáš, *Dějiny* 53–54 (French summary, 547), and below, 159. In *Verr.* 2.4.67–68 Cicero calls Antiochus *amicus et socius populi Romani*.

father-in-law and ally, invaded Armenia. Antiochus then returned to Antioch and was recognized by Lucullus as king, as Antiochus XIII.<sup>4</sup> Cobban points out<sup>5</sup> that Lucullus by this action was supporting "that traditional bulwark of Roman policy, the client-kingdom." The new ruler, however, was unable to maintain himself on the throne. He was attacked by an Arab dynast, Aziz, who was trying to enlarge his power in Syria, and by another Seleucid claimant, Philip, son of the Philip I Philadelphus (93-84 B.C.) who had been one of his father's rivals. Antiochus XIII was seized and imprisoned by Sampsigeramus, an Arab chieftain who had pretended to support him, and Philip managed to set himself up as Seleucid king in 67/6 B.C.<sup>6</sup>

At this point, in 67 B.C., Pompey carried out his famous campaign against the pirates. The Lex Gabinia of January, 67 B.C., which established his extraordinary command for three years, gave him, among other things, equal authority with the proconsular provincial governors who were in charge of coastal regions, up to fifty miles from the sea;<sup>7</sup> he also was given the right to raise money, in addition to the sums which he received from the quaestors. One of the governors who would have to cooperate with Pompey was Q. Marcius Rex, the consul of 68 B.C., whose province in 67 B.C. was Cilicia, where the pirates had their principal base.<sup>8</sup> While he was proconsul of Cilicia, Marcius Rex visited Antioch, in order, it has been thought, to obtain financial help from Philip in the war against the pirates. During this visit the Roman proconsul built a palace and a circus at Antioch.

During the following year (66 B.C.) Pompey, having subdued the pirates, was engaged in the prosecution of the war against Mithri-

<sup>4</sup> Appian *Syr.* 49. Justinus (40.22) says that Antiochus XIII was summoned to the throne of Syria by Lucullus. The careers of Antiochus XIII and Philip II were first definitively reconstructed by J. Dobiaš, "Philippos Barypous," *Listy filologické* 51 (1924) 214-227 (with a summary in French, pp. VI-VII); cf. the same scholar's *Dějiny* 52 ff., 549-550, and Bellinger, *End of the Seleucids* 82-83.

<sup>5</sup> *Loc. cit.* (above, n. 1).

<sup>6</sup> Diodorus 40.1a-1b.

<sup>7</sup> On this Gabinian law, see *Fontes Iuris Romani Antejustiniani*, pt. 1, *Leges*, ed. S. Riccobono (Florence 1941) 121-131; G. Rotondi, *Leges Publicae Populi Romani* (Milan 1912) 371-372; T. Rice Holmes, *The Roman Republic and the Founder of the Empire* (Oxford 1923) 1.169-173; A. E. R. Boak, "The Extraordinary Commands from 80 to 48 B.C.," *AHR* 24 (1918-1919) 12.

<sup>8</sup> For the evidence for the career of Marcius Rex, see further below.

dates; at the end of this year he was appointed by a Manilian Law<sup>9</sup> to succeed Q. Marcius Rex as governor of Cilicia. During 66 B.C. Philip II seems to have continued to occupy the throne in Antioch. Philip, however, was forced out in 65/4 B.C., in circumstances which are not entirely clear. Antiochus XIII was released by his Arab captor and reigned as Seleucid king for one year (65/4 B.C.) until Pompey, having beaten Mithridates, was able (64 B.C.) to effect a settlement of affairs in the East, by which Syria was annexed as a Roman province.

These have been considered to be the principal events which preceded the annexation. It is known that between the retirement from Syria of Tigranes (69 B.C.) and the annexation (64 B.C.), Antiochus XIII (69–67/6 B.C.), then Philip II (67/6–66/5 B.C.), then Antiochus XIII again (65/4 B.C.) occupied the Seleucid throne, and Cobban has pointed out that Antiochus, at least during his first reign, was a client king. This has been the extent of our present knowledge. It is, however, possible to recover further details of the measures with respect to Syria which were adopted at this period. In order to understand these, we must first examine the meaning of the “province of Cilicia” and then the activities of Marcius Rex.

The “province of Cilicia” was established, in about 102 or 101 B.C., as a special command in an effort to deal with the pirates who had their stronghold in that region.<sup>10</sup> The territorial limits of this *provincia* are not known exactly, but it does not seem to have included Cilicia itself, which was still nominally Seleucid territory. In 92 B.C. Sulla, as governor of Cilicia, was sent to Cappadocia, with the mission of driving out Gordius, the protégé of Mithridates, and placing the Roman candidate, Ariobarzanes, on the throne.<sup>11</sup> Cilicia Pedias was occupied by Tigranes in 83 B.C.<sup>12</sup> In 74 B.C., however, Lucullus was made governor of Asia and Cilicia in order to prosecute the war against Mithridates.<sup>13</sup> In 66 B.C. it was proposed (by Manilius, one of the popular tribunes) that Pompey be given the provinces of Bithynia and Cilicia, for the prosecution of

<sup>9</sup> See below, n. 14.

<sup>10</sup> See A. H. M. Jones, *Cities of the Eastern Roman Provinces* (Oxford 1937) 198–203; Dobiáš, *Les premiers rapports* 255, n. 1.

<sup>11</sup> Frölich, “L. Cornelius Sulla (No. 392),” *RE* 4 (1901) 1527–1528; Dobiáš, *Les premiers rapports* 218.

<sup>12</sup> Appian *Syr.* 48; Dio 36.37.6; Plutarch *Pomp.* 28.

<sup>13</sup> Gelzer, “Licinius Lucullus,” *RE* 13 (1927) 383–384; Boak *op. cit.* (above, n. 7) 7.

the war against Mithridates and Tigranes.<sup>14</sup> It seems plain that the "province of Cilicia" was understood to be a command which could be utilized as a base for diplomatic or military activity, according to the circumstances of the moment. The pirates (until the time of Pompey) apparently continued to occupy their strongholds unmolested.

In 68 B.C., when Q. Marcius Rex was (because of the deaths of both his colleague and the *suffectus*) serving as consul alone,<sup>15</sup> the two chief problems in the East were the war with Mithridates (directed by Lucullus) and the menace of the pirates. In consequence, Marcius Rex was given the "province of Cilicia" for 67 B.C., succeeding Lucullus, and Q. Metellus Creticus (consul in 69 B.C.) was sent to Crete, the two being supposed to make a joint drive against the pirates.<sup>16</sup> Metellus Creticus had some success, but Marcius Rex's departure from Rome was delayed,<sup>17</sup> and the whole aspect of the operation was changed by a Lex Gabinia of 67 B.C. which established an extraordinary command for Pompey. Marcius Rex thus became one of the governors whose task it would be to assist Pompey; we hear for example of Marcius giving his brother-in-law, Clodius Pulcher, a naval command (as a result of which Clodius was promptly captured by the pirates).<sup>18</sup>

One activity of Marcius Rex which has not yet been explained in a wholly satisfactory manner is the visit which he made to Philip II in Antioch. It is this visit which indicates that the Romans at this time were planning an arrangement with respect to Syria which has not hitherto been perceived.

The sole extant account of this episode is that of John Malalas, a sixth-century writer who lived in Antioch and wrote, for popular consumption, a chronicle recording the history of the world from Creation to A.D. 565 (or 574). Malalas devoted particular attention to the history of Antioch. His material on the city was drawn,

<sup>14</sup> On this Manilian Law, which was passed in 66 B.C., see Dio 36.42.4 and Plutarch *Pomp.* 30; cf. E. Weiss, "Leges Maniliae," *RE* 12 (1925) 2397-2398, and Boak *op. cit.* (above, n. 7) 13.

<sup>15</sup> Dio 36.4.1.

<sup>16</sup> Münzer, "Marcius Rex (No. 92)," *RE* 14 (1930) 1584; *id.*, "Q. Caecilius Metellus Creticus (No. 87)," *RE* 3 (1899) 1210-1211.

<sup>17</sup> Suetonius *Caes.* 8; see Cobban, *op. cit.* (above, n. 1) 121.

<sup>18</sup> Dio 36.17.2-3. On the disposition of Pompey's forces, see H. A. Ormerod, "The Distribution of Pompey's Forces in the Campaign of 67 B.C.," *Annals of Archaeology and Anthropology* (University of Liverpool) 10 (1923) 43-51.

directly or ultimately, from excellent sources, including local official records, but the chronicler (or his sources) managed to misunderstand or garble some of the information, with the result that in some cases the chronicle contains childish mistakes and incomprehensibly confused statements. Nevertheless the work is on occasion a source of great value, sometimes preserving as it does material which is not extant elsewhere.<sup>19</sup>

In his account of Agrippa's visit to Antioch in 15 B.C., Malalas writes that Agrippa "cleared out of the old circus the debris which it contained from a previous earthquake. Quintus Marcius, *rex* of the Romans, had earlier built this old circus and the old palace, with his own funds, when he came down to Antioch in Syria to Philip the Heavyfooted [i.e., Philip II], of the Macedonian house, who was reigning in Antioch, to arrange for him to pay *phoroi* to the Romans."<sup>20</sup>

This report is confirmed to the extent that there exist at Antioch remains of a circus, excavated and studied in 1932, which seems to be that of Marcius Rex. The structure is described by its excavator, W. A. Campbell, as "one of the largest and most important circuses of the Roman Empire"; its construction is dated by archaeological evidence and by the character of the masonry in the first century B.C.<sup>21</sup> Since the structure is typically Roman in design, and since there is no occasion known in the history of Antioch earlier in the first century on which such a circus would have been constructed, it seems very likely that Marcius Rex built it.

In calling the circus "old," Malalas is evidently writing from the point of view of his own time. There existed at Antioch, in addition to the circus which Marcius Rex seems to have built, a smaller structure, which the excavators have called "the Byzantine

<sup>19</sup> On the chronicle of Malalas and its values and deficiencies, see G. Moravcsik, *Die byz. Quellen der Geschichte der Türkvolker* (Budapest 1942) 184-189, with bibliography.

<sup>20</sup> Mal. p. 225.7-11 Bonn ed., cited from the text of A. Schenk von Stauffenberg, *Die röm. Kaisergeschichte bei Malalas* (Stuttgart 1931) 10: Ἐκτίσσε δὲ πρῶτον τὸ αὐτὸ παλαιὸν ἵππικὸν καὶ τὸ παλαιὸν παλάτιον ἐκ τῶν ἰδίων Κόϊντος [δὲ] Μαρκιανὸς ῥῆξ Ῥωμαίων, κατελθὼν ἐν Ἀντιοχείᾳ τῆς Συρίας πρὸς Φίλιππον τὸν Βαρυπουν τὸν Μακεδόνα τὸν βασιλεύοντα ἐν Ἀντιοχείᾳ τυπῶσαι φόρους δίδοναι αὐτὸν Ῥωμαίοις. After Κόϊντος, δὲ is added by a second hand. After Συρίας the Church Slavonic version adds the equivalent of ἀπὸ τῆς Ῥώμης. Malalas' mistaking the cognomen Rex for the title is characteristic of the chronicler's ignorance in such matters.

<sup>21</sup> See Campbell's report in *Antioch-on-the-Orontes*, 1: *The Excavations of 1932*, ed. by G. W. Elderkin (Princeton 1934) 34-41.

stadium," built in the late fifth or early sixth century after Christ.<sup>22</sup> Thus, in Malalas' time, there existed both the great circus and the newer stadium, and it was doubtless the custom to distinguish the former as "the old circus."

Malalas' description of Marcius Rex's visit to Antioch has given rise to a number of different interpretations. C. O. Müller,<sup>23</sup> though he considered the report of the building of the circus and the palace exaggerated, saw in the episode evidence that the Romans were preparing to take over control of Antioch. J. Dobiáš<sup>24</sup> suggested that Marcius Rex went to Antioch to obtain a contribution for the war against the pirates. A. Schenk von Stauffenberg<sup>25</sup> supposed that Marcius Rex supported Philip's accession to the throne, and that in return for his backing he was assured the proceeds of the *phoroi*; the palace and the circus would have been built (or repaired, if the extent of Marcius' work was exaggerated in antiquity, which could easily happen) in order to give tangible evidence of Rome's support of Philip. The present writer suggested in an earlier study<sup>26</sup> that the Romans supported Philip after he had come to the throne, and that Marcius Rex was chosen to aid the new ruler because, as proconsul of Cilicia, he was near at hand; Malalas' statement about the *phoroi* would simply mean that Marcius Rex demanded a "contribution" or "gift" as the price of Rome's friendship. M. Rostovtzeff,<sup>27</sup> developing this suggestion, concluded that Philip was forced to pay Marcius Rex "a heavy contribution, probably on the pretext of helping Pompey in his operations against the pirates, but in fact as a fee to secure, for a brief period, Roman recognition." A. R. Bellinger<sup>28</sup> believed that Marcius Rex went to Antioch to secure funds from Philip for aid in the naval war and that in return he assisted in the repair of the circus and the palace. E. S. Bouchier, without going into the question in detail, wrote that "Q. Marcius Rex, who held a command in Cilicia in 68 B.C. [*sic*], seems to have been the first officer to enter into negotiations on the

<sup>22</sup> See the report on its excavation by W. A. Campbell in *Antioch* 1 (cited above, n. 21) 32-33.

<sup>23</sup> *Antiquitates Antiochenae* (Göttingen 1839) 67.

<sup>24</sup> *Dějiny* 61, 549.

<sup>25</sup> *Op. cit.* (above, n. 20) 177-178.

<sup>26</sup> "Q. Marcius Rex at Antioch," *CP* 32 (1937) 144-151.

<sup>27</sup> *Social and Economic History of the Hellenistic World* (Oxford 1941) 2.983-984.

<sup>28</sup> *End of the Seleucids* 83-84.

subject [of the annexation of Syria], and he presented the citizens [of Antioch] with a circus and palace."<sup>29</sup>

Many of these interpretations seem possible or plausible. Further consideration of the passage, however, suggests another, more precise, explanation of the episode, which is, moreover, much more in keeping with what we should expect Roman policy to be at this time.

In the first place, it seems likely that Marcius Rex's mission to Antioch was among the duties of his tenure of the "province of Cilicia" which would have been prescribed in 68 B.C., before he left Rome to assume the proconsulship. In this case the mission would have represented a plan which had been made before the Gabinian Law of 67 B.C., which gave Pompey his extraordinary command for the war against the pirates. Whether or not this was the case, Marcius' principal mission as proconsul being to combat the pirates, it is natural to suppose that his prescribed sphere of activity included the region of Syria adjacent to Cilicia (including Antioch), which the pirates were readily able to use as a refuge and a base of operations.<sup>30</sup> Strabo (14.5.1-2, p. 668C) gives the weakness of the Seleucid kings, who nominally ruled Cilicia, as one of the main reasons for the strength of the pirates in Cilicia. Moreover, one of the claimants to the Seleucid throne, Philip II, was in exile in Cilicia, and since the situation in Syria was intimately connected with that in Cilicia, it would be only natural to give Marcius Rex a command which would enable him to deal with the government in Syria. Any settlement which was reached in Syria might be expected to have to take into account not only the occupant of the throne, Antiochus XIII, but his rival, Philip II. These considerations make it seem reasonably clear that Marcius Rex's visit to Antioch was an official one, and did not represent a personal enterprise which illegally took him outside his "province." Malalas notes that Marcius Rex paid for the construction of the palace and the circus ἐκ τῶν ἰδίων, but this can hardly be true. Even if Marcius built such structures out of the proceeds of a triumph — and we know of no such triumph at this time — it would seem surprising

<sup>29</sup> *Syria as a Roman Province* (Oxford 1916) 62. Marcius Rex's work is mentioned only incidentally in the same author's *A Short History of Antioch* (Oxford 1921) 95, and the political significance of his visit is not discussed.

<sup>30</sup> For an account of piracy and brigandage in Syria, see Dobiaś, *Les premiers rapports* 223, 245, 247-249.

to find him spending his money on buildings in Antioch. The only plausible conclusion is that the buildings were paid for by the Roman government, in an effort to exhibit the power of Rome and its goodwill toward the people of Antioch. Malalas, mistaking the cognomen Rex for the royal title, concluded that the building of the structures was an act of regal generosity, comparable to King Herod's gifts to Antioch,<sup>31</sup> and added the phrase *ἐκ τῶν ἰδίων* on his own initiative.

This reconstruction of the episode agrees with what we know of the status which the Seleucid house had recently enjoyed with the Roman government. During the action against Verres in the summer of 70 B.C., while Tigranes was still occupying Syria and Antiochus XIII was in exile, Cicero spoke of Antiochus as *amicus et socius populi Romani* (Verr. 2.4.67-68), and Lucullus, as we have seen, recognized Antiochus' claim to the Seleucid throne after the fall of Tigranes. Antiochus' rival Philip bears the surname *Φιλορῶματος* in an inscription found near Olba in Cilicia.<sup>32</sup> The inscription bears no date, and we thus cannot determine whether Philip used this title while he was still in exile (as Antiochus did), or only after he came to power in Antioch. In any case it is clear from these texts that the Seleucids were regarded as client kings in theory if not in fact; and we have thus one more reason to suppose that Marcius Rex visited Philip, and built a circus and a palace, as an official representative of the Roman government.

The meaning of the evidence seems, then, to be as follows. When Marcius Rex was entrusted with the "province of Cilicia," one phase of the problem of the pirates was their ability to use Syria (or at least the region around Antioch, with its inaccessible mountains close to the sea) as a stronghold, unmolested by the weak Seleucid government (see above, p. 155). The pirates could not be suppressed unless Syria were somehow brought under Roman control. Annexation of the country would bring the usual financial and administrative problems which a new province presented. On the other hand the last representatives of the Seleucid house, with

<sup>31</sup> Herod's gifts to Antioch: Malalas 223.17-19; Josephus *Bell.* 1.425, *Ant.* 15.218, 16.148. See R. Daniel, *M. Vipsanius Agrippa: eine Monographie* (Diss. Breslau 1933) 31-37.

<sup>32</sup> *Monumenta Asiae Minoris Antiqua* 3, ed. by J. Keil and A. Wilhelm (Manchester 1931), No. 62, pp. 64-66. On the political conditions in Olba which this inscription reflects, see Jones *op. cit.* (above, n. 10) 202.



their constant rivalries, were so weak, and their control over their nominal domain was so feeble, that not much help against the pirates could be expected from them if they were left to their own resources. The solution which would naturally suggest itself was that the Seleucid ruler, already regarded, while Tigranes was in Syria, as a "friend and ally of the Roman people," be made a client king in fact (Antiochus was on the throne, recognized by Lucullus, when Marcius Rex left Rome, Philip when the proconsul visited Antioch; the difference would not have mattered greatly).<sup>33</sup> Marcius' visit to Philip and the construction of the palace and the circus represented a rather munificent way of proclaiming this policy. For the people of Antioch (as well as for its ruler) there could be no more tangible or more substantial symbols of Roman power than a palace and a circus which was among the largest and finest in the Roman world. The Romans had always posed as the liberators of cities, and as their protectors against the pirates or the tyrants who dominated them (this was Pompey's policy in particular with regard to the cities of the Decapolis). There may well have been a party in Antioch which realized that the Seleucid government would not be able to function effectively by itself, and saw that the only hope for peace and order lay in Roman suzerainty. The members of such a party would be able to point to the palace and the circus as tangible examples of the benefits that would follow upon Roman protection. For the Romans the cost of the buildings would be amply repaid if it became possible as a consequence to exclude the pirates from Syria. Finally, it seems quite possible that it was realized that eventual annexation would be the only solution, and that the construction of these buildings was thought of as laying a foundation for that ultimate step. Certainly an indirect and hesitant approach of this kind, avoiding a final commitment, is characteristic of Roman policy at this period.<sup>34</sup>

<sup>33</sup> On the significance of the client king's "friendship" for Rome, and on the use of the surname *Philorhomaioi*, see P. C. Sands, *The Client Princes of the Roman Empire* (Cambridge 1908) 10 ff., 17, 89-90. See also G. H. Stevenson, *Roman Provincial Administration* (Oxford 1939), Ch. 2, "The Client Princes," 36-52, and Cobban, *op. cit.* (above, n. 1) "Rome and the Client-Princes," pp. 60-64.

<sup>34</sup> The "gradual and indistinct process" by which Roman protectorate was established in the eastern Mediterranean may be followed in the studies of Sands (cited in n. 33; see especially the summary on 71) and of Stevenson (cited in n. 33), ch. 1-2, pp. 1-52.

As for the *phoroi* which Marcius Rex is supposed to have requested from Philip — a “contribution,” presumably, rather than taxes, for Velleius Paterculus notes (2.37.5) that Syria paid taxes only after the annexation — the sum available cannot have been large, for the Seleucid government at this time embraced only a restricted territory, and probably did not control even that very closely. Probably the Roman government was not so much interested in the amount which would be gained as in the fact that its payment would constitute evidence of “cooperation” on the part of the Seleucid ruler.

Our knowledge of the events which took place between the time of Marcius’ visit to Antioch and the final annexation of Syria is unfortunately not detailed. Clodius, it will be recalled, had been given a naval command by his brother-in-law Marcius Rex, but was captured by the pirates. On being released, because of the pirates’ fear of Pompey, Clodius went to Antioch. There, Dio says (36.17.3), he declared that he would be an ally of the people of Antioch against the Arabs, against whom they were then struggling. “There, likewise (Dio continues), he stirred up a sedition and all but lost his life.” What we know of Clodius’ character makes it possible to believe that he undertook this mission on his own responsibility. However, if Antioch was included in Marcius Rex’s *provincia*, and if Clodius had lately been serving under the proconsul, it also seems quite possible that Marcius Rex sent Clodius to Antioch to assist the Seleucid government in its resistance to the Arabs. Clodius was of course quite capable of embarking on intrigue which would bring his official mission to confusion; but it may be asked whether even he would have dared to undertake independently an unauthorized and dangerous personal adventure within his brother-in-law’s *provincia*. The chances seem to be, then, that Dio’s brief and perfunctory words preserve a record of a failure (possibly as much the fault of Marcius Rex as of Clodius) of an effort on the part of the Romans to guide the affairs of the new client king, and to impress the people of Antioch with the Romans’ benevolence toward them.

As to Marcius Rex himself, we have no specific evidence of further activity on his part in connection with the government at Antioch. We do know, however, from Dio (36.43.1) that at the end of 66 B.C. he was removed from his command before its period had expired, and was replaced by Pompey, and that in the same

year his troops had been given to Pompey for the latter's operations against Mithridates (Dio 36.48.1).

King Philip's history at this time is likewise obscure. During 66/5 B.C. he seems to have occupied the throne at Antioch;<sup>35</sup> but then he disappeared — why, we do not know — and his rival Antiochus XIII Asiaticus, released from captivity by Sampsi-geramus, appears as Seleucid king during 65/4 B.C.<sup>36</sup> Whether there was any connection between the removal of Marcius Rex from his command and the disappearance of Philip, we do not know. It may well have been that Marcius Rex and Philip were both removed because it had become apparent that neither was competent to maintain the Seleucid throne in client status. Whether Antiochus' return was approved or arranged by Rome is again a question. Antiochus could have a claim to be regarded as the legitimate ruler in that his claim to the throne had been recognized by the Senate about 72 B.C. and later by Lucullus.<sup>37</sup> Ultimately, Pompey is reported to have refused a request of Antiochus that he be allowed to keep his throne, thus reversing the policy of Lucullus.<sup>38</sup> What the legal basis was for Pompey's final action (which is indicated by the coins of Antioch) will be shown presently. Before taking this up, however, it will be illuminating to review the different accounts of Pompey's conduct which are preserved in the literary sources. Justinus (40.2.3–5) writes as follows: Sed quod Lucullus dederat [*sc.* the rule of Syria], postea ademit Pompeius, qui poscenti [*sc.* Antiocho] regnum respondit ne volenti quidem Syriae, nedum recusanti daturum se regem, qui x et vii annis, quibus Tigranes Syriam tenuit, in angulo Ciliciae latuerit, victo autem eodem Tigrae a Romanis alieni operis praemia postulet. Igitur ut habenti regnum non ademerit, ita quo cesserit Tigrani, non daturum, quod tueri nesciat, ne rursus Syriam Iudaeorum et Arabum latrociniis infestam reddat. Atque ita Syriam in provinciae formam redegit, paulatimque Oriens Romanorum discordia consanguineorum regum factus est. On the other hand Appian

<sup>35</sup> Dobiáš, *Philippos Barypous* (cited above, n. 4) 226–227; Bellinger, *End of the Seleucids* 83–84.

<sup>36</sup> Appian *Syr.* 70; Dobiáš, *Philippos Barypous* (cited above, n. 4) 226–227; Bellinger, *End of the Seleucids* 84.

<sup>37</sup> See above, notes 3–4.

<sup>38</sup> The differences between the policies of Lucullus and Pompey in these matters are pointed out by T. Frank, *Roman Imperialism* (New York 1925) 316, and Cobban, *op. cit.* (above, n. 1) 117, 135–136.

(*Syr.* 49)<sup>39</sup> says that "Pompey, the successor of Lucullus, when he had overthrown Mithridates, allowed Tigranes to reign in Armenia and expelled Antiochus from the government of Syria, although he had done the Romans no wrong. The real reason for this was that it was easy for Pompey, with an army under his command, to annex a large, defenceless empire, but the pretence was that it was unnatural for the Seleucids, whom Tigranes had dethroned, to govern Syria, rather than the Romans who had conquered Tigranes." In *Mith.* 106,<sup>40</sup> however, Appian gives as the real and only reason for the annexation the motive which in *Syr.* 49 he cited as the pretended reason: "He [*sc.* Pompey] advanced against, and brought under Roman rule without fighting, those parts of Cilicia which were not yet subject to it, and the remainder of Syria which lies along the Euphrates, and the countries called Coele-Syria, Phoenicia, and Palestine, also Idumea and Ituraea, and the other parts of Syria by whatever name called; not that he had any complaint against Antiochus, the son of Antiochus Pius, who was present and asked for his paternal kingdom, but because he thought that, since he had himself dispossessed Tigranes, the conqueror of Antiochus, it belonged to the Romans by right of war." In *Syr.* 70 Appian merely reports the expulsion of Antiochus XIII without mentioning any reason.

Quite a different report appears in Plutarch's life of Pompey (39.2), in which it is said that Pompey declared Syria to be a province and possession of the Roman people *ὡς οὐκ ἔχουσιν γνήσιους βασιλεῖς*. The ordinary meaning of *γνήσιος* in such a context would be "legitimate" — that is, Plutarch would mean that Pompey annexed Syria "because it had no legitimate kings." Antiochus XIII had once been recognized as king of Syria by the Senate, and Philip II had borne the surname *Philorhomaïos*, and apparently had enjoyed the support and approval of Q. Marcius Rex. It would of course have been easy for the Romans to repudiate or ignore their commitments in this respect. It is, however, possible that Plutarch was using *γνήσιος* in the sense of "real," "true," meaning "capable" or "competent," and in this case Plutarch's statement would represent what would seem to have been one of Pompey's real motives.

<sup>39</sup> Translation of H. White, Loeb Classical Library.

<sup>40</sup> Translation of H. White, Loeb Classical Library.

If these passages do not simply represent unconsidered statements made by writers who were not well informed and did not take the trouble to consider the point carefully, they are significant because they show the nature of the reports concerning the transaction which were current in antiquity. It must be remembered, of course, that the reason (or reasons) which Pompey finally gave out for the annexation would not necessarily reflect what was really in his mind, and that there would be no occasion for him to say (or for historians to record) that the annexation was effected because the Romans had found that a client government was unsatisfactory; and as Tenney Frank has pointed out,<sup>41</sup> Pompey knew that Lucullus' establishment of Antiochus XIII on the throne of Syria did not ultimately please the Roman government. Such a reason, indeed, would best be buried in discreet silence. There may even have been still another version of the affair, representing the local Antiochene point of view. This may indeed preserve a hint that a formality of abdication was observed. Malalas (211.16-19) presents Pompey as a friend and defender of the people of Antioch, honoring them because they were of Athenian descent and rebuilding their dilapidated bouleuterion. The chronicler then relates (212.9-17) that on the defeat of Tigranes, Antiochus<sup>42</sup> asked Pompey for the return of his kingdom. This Pompey granted, and Antiochus once more became king. When Antiochus was about to die, he bequeathed his kingdom to the Romans (212.20-213.1). Malalas' reputation being what it is, we cannot accept this account without question, and the whole story might be dismissed as fantasy.<sup>43</sup> However, it seems possible that the account is based upon a local Antiochene version of the transaction, designed to make the Roman occupation of Antioch seem less of a humiliation. It seems not at all unlikely that Antiochus was allowed to abdicate, and that this was the origin of the story of his bequest of his kingdom to the Romans, which had honorable precedent, of course, in the testament of Attalus II bequeathing Pergamum to Rome.<sup>44</sup>

<sup>41</sup> *Op. cit.* (above, n. 38) 317.

<sup>42</sup> In the Greek text of Malalas, the name of the last of the Seleucids is given as "Antiochus Dionikous." The Church Slavonic version, which represents an older state of the text than the Greek version which we possess, has "Antiochus Dionysos," obviously an error for Antiochus XII Dionysus, 87-84 B.C.; see G. Downey, "Seleucid Chronology in Malalas," *AJA* 42 (1938) 112-113.

<sup>43</sup> See Bellinger's remarks on the subject, *End of the Seleucids* 85, n. 110.

<sup>44</sup> It has been suggested that Pompey's claim that Syria belonged to Rome by right of conquest "cut the knot of Rome's responsibility as nominal protector of the

In any case, it seems evident (as Plutarch may have meant to say) that it had become plain to the Romans that it would be impractical to maintain a Seleucid ruler in client status, and that the annexation, proclaimed in 64 B.C., was the only practical solution of the problem. What the legal basis of the final solution was is indicated by the coins of Antioch of this period. A recent study of these coins by H. Seyrig<sup>45</sup> has shown that when Pompey annexed Syria he established a new era reckoned retrospectively from the autumn of 66 B.C. This was the date of the surrender of Tigranes to Pompey. Thus it seems clear, as Seyrig points out, that in choosing this epoch for his new era, which was to replace the Seleucid era previously in use, Pompey now wished to show that in his estimation Syria had passed into his control on the day of Tigranes' surrender, and that simultaneously the royal rule of Syria had ceased. Juridically, this disposition of the matter would agree with the explanation mentioned by Justinus and with one of those mentioned by Appian. It is to be noted, however, that the testimony of the coins indicates that the era was established in 64/3 B.C., so that from the legal point of view it supplanted whatever different arrangements had been tried between the autumn of 66 B.C. and 64/3 B.C.

Thus the steps indicated by the present study may be summarized as follows: (1) Between 69 B.C. and 66 B.C. an effort was made to maintain Antiochus XIII on the throne of Syria as a client king. (2) Between 66 B.C. and 64/3 B.C. there were further attempts to regulate the government of Syria, presumably on the same basis, in a way which did not involve annexation. (3) When these efforts proved unsuccessful, a retroactive legal basis for annexation was established. (4) At the same time, there are preserved in the narratives of Justinus, Appian, Plutarch and Malalas indications of the different interpretations which were placed upon both the arrangements which were tried and upon the settlement which was finally reached.

Seleucids, but . . . was at the same time only another way of saying that his government was not bound to recognize a new member of a family which had proved to be incapable of protecting itself" (Sands, *op. cit.* [above, n. 33] 85). Pompey would thus have avoided an admission that the protectorate had failed. This may well have been the case. However, if it were true that Antiochus was allowed (or forced) to abdicate, Pompey's difficulty would have been solved.

<sup>45</sup> H. Seyrig, "Antiquités syriennes, 42: Sur les ères de quelques villes de Syrie," *Syria* 27 (1950) 5-15.

The picture which we have recovered rests necessarily upon rather slender evidence, which is not always firm or clear. It does, however, explain in a more satisfactory way than has hitherto been possible some of the scanty records which have come down to us, and it seems beyond question that the Roman policy which this picture indicates, with its hesitation and experimentation, is a characteristic one. Annexation in this case was the only possible decision; but it was not a decision made only when Pompey was finally faced with the necessity of reaching a solution; it was an ultimate step, shown to be necessary by the demonstrably unsatisfactory results of the alternative device.

The disappearance from our texts of any clear indication of the course of this experimental policy can be understood when it is realized that with much more important events on foot the story of the ineffective efforts to control the Seleucid throne was of minor interest; and after the problem of Syria had been solved by annexation, there was little disposition to remember and record the previous unsuccessful effort at a solution — an effort which covered only a brief period of time and was attended by a sequence of confused and (to the ancient historians) rather uninteresting developments.